Historically, India has relied on subsidizing staple food as a major instrument in improving food security. Recently, however, cash transfers have entered the debate as an alternative, as they are associated with lower market distortions, leakages and fiscal costs. This study contributes to this debate by analyzing India's Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS). Our main objective was to explain the under-purchase, or low take-up, from the TPDS, which is typically attributed to 'leakage', i.e. the diversion of food grains from eligible consumers. We provide an alternative solution based on self-targeting; while poorer households increase their consumption from the TPDS, wealthier households restrain from consuming subsidized commodities. Using a large household dataset, we estimated that such a voluntary opt-out system, based on income, would save a minimum of 6.5% of grains released through the TPDS. Besides these demand-driven aspects, our analysis indicates that poor regions perform better at lowering the diversion of grains and that large targeting errors exist among female-led households. Finally, we find substantial regional price differences that would benefit the poor and rural population under a uniform cash-transfer system that does not correct for regional price levels.
Introduction
Millions of people in low-and middle-income countries around the word currently benefit from in-kind transfers. Besides delivering food at low prices to food-insecure households, in-kind programs usually simultaneously target other food security objectives, such as food price stabilization and stockholding policies (Pillay and Kumar 2018; Von Braun et al. 1992) .
The Public Distribution System (PDS), an in-kind food subsidy program whose basic principles were laid down in 1942, is regarded as one of the most stable elements of India's food policy. It has gone through several reforms, which mainly changed the target group. The Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) was introduced in 1997 with the objective of identifying poor people across the country and providing them with rationed and subsidized quantities of essential commodities, mostly focusing on wheat, rice, sugar, and kerosene. From November 2016, the TPDS was gradually replaced by the world's largest food aid and social assistance program, the so-called National Food Security Act (NFSA). The NFSA aimed to scale up the existing distribution system by extending its inclusion criteria; 67% of the nation (covering on average 50% of the urban and 75% of the rural population) is now entitled to highly subsidized wheat, rice and coarse grains delivered through the TPDS. While a universal coverage under the NFSA was initially discussed, the selected 67% seems to correspond roughly with the 69% of the Indian population estimated as living on below 2 US$ (PPP) a day (Varadharajan et al. 2014) . Some states offer Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-019-00942-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. additional subsidy or coverage; for example, in Tamil Nadu the PDS is universal.
The broad inclusion of the population and high subsidy level have led to mounting fiscal costs and added fuel to a long-lasting discussion between proponents of a cash-based system (Basu 2010; Jha and Ramaswami 2010; Yu et al. 2015) and advocates of reforms within the existing targeted subsidies-based approach (Drèze 2011; Drèze and Sen 2013) . More recently, the debate has revolved around the (quasi) Universal Basic Income (UBI) (Drèze 2017; Khosla 2018) , proposed to target the poorest 75% of the population (Government of India (GoI) 2017).
At the same time, there is growing evidence for the costeffectiveness of cash-transfers in delivering food security (Banerjee et al. 2017; Gentilini 2016; Margolies and Hoddinott 2015) , and technological and methodological advances offer the means for their efficient implementation (Alderman et al. 2017, 19; Hanna 2017; Saini et al. 2017; Springmann et al. 2016 ). Many countries have moved away from food subsidy programs towards vouchers or cash transfers. In general, the changes in these systems can be characterized with respect to two aspects -one is related to the coverage (from targeted to universal) and the other is related to the form of transfer (from food subsidy to cash transfer) (Alderman et al. 2017) . For example, Egypt introduced food vouchers in 2014, replacing its food subsidy program which dated back to the 1940s. This was in an attempt to fight the diversion of subsidized flour from recipients to the open market. In common with many countries in the Middle East and North Africa, the provision of food subsidy has been almost universal (reaching around 90% of the Egyptian population), since it is traditionally the state's responsibility to provide affordable food to everyone (Abdalla and Al-Shawarby 2017; Kamal 2015) . Also, Sri Lanka, through a series of more radical reforms, transformed its generalized food subsidy program into targeted cash transfers in 2012. This transformation was plagued with challenges and setbacks, including large targeting errors and implementation issues (Sooriyamudali and Chinthani 2017; Weerahewa et al. 2018) .
Irrespective of the method of distribution, a major goal of food subsidy programs is to eliminate or minimize exclusion errors (omission of the poor from the scheme, also known as type I targeting errors), while remaining fiscally sustainable. Avoiding exclusion errors is the major reason for the high coverage rate envisioned by the NFSA, the proposed cash transfers, and the UBI (Government of India (GoI) 2017, 176). They all aim to cover at least 67% of the Indian population, as compared to 29.5% covered by the previous system (Planning Commission 2014). In this context, the question arises whether in-kind transfer programs can be more efficient than cash transfers.
Self-targeting has been utilized for decades as a mechanism to target the poor in social safety programs, particularly those relating to food (Alderman and Lindert 1998) . By selftargeting, we understand that only the poor choose to consume the subsidized commodities, while those with greater means voluntarily opt out of the program due to the character of the subsidized goods or the channels of delivery. This means that the government can make the program available to a broad group of people without having to determine their financial status, which can be an extremely difficult task. The goal is to reduce leakages to the non-poor and cut the scope of the program, whilst protecting the interests of the poor. Examples of governments looking for a reduction of costs of universal food subsidy programs, by using self-targeting, are found in Tunisia and Egypt, where the subsidized goods are inferior to others on the market. The reforms were evaluated as successful in cutting fiscal costs while protecting the poor (Richard Jr. 1999; World Bank 1996) . Importantly, costsavings arising from self-targeting would be lost under cash transfers, meaning that the same broad coverage would be more costly. The administrative costs of determining eligibility will increase if the government significantly narrows the recipient base, however this will also lead to a higher risk of exclusion of the poor.
In India, the quantity of grains consumed under the PDS by eligible households is often lower than their full entitlement. This difference is estimated to be around 40%. In the literature, this is attributed to reasons of both supply and demand. Supply-side reasons include the diversion of goods through corruption (Gulati and Saini 2015; Drèze and Khera 2015) , and poor storage and transport facilities (Shreedhar et al. 2012 ). An example of a demand-side reason is the low quality of PDS grains and the resulting preference for free market grains (Khera 2011) . The supply-side problems are often subsumed under the term 'leakage' and associated with the inefficiency of the PDS to deliver goods to foodinsecure households. This could be solved by eliminating the handling of the goods, i.e. by replacing food subsidies with cash transfers. However, the demandside problem described indicates that there is a potential of self-targeting by poorer households back into the program and, consequently, substitution of cash transfers would result in efficiency loss. This study focused specifically on self-targeting and evaluating its scale in the PDS. We addressed the issue of low take-up, or under-purchase of subsidized goods, and provide a new explanation based on self-targeting. Based on nationally representative household data, we provide an in-depth analysis of TPDS consumption, looking beyond supply-side reasons for no take-up or under-purchase of PDS grains at the allIndia level. Based on these findings, we simulated the impact of implementing cash transfers on different consumer groups as well as cost implications for the government. As cash transfers will discourage self-targeting, their cost savings might be lower than typically assumed.
Further, we addressed the problem of regional commodity price differences, which are substantial in a large and diverse country like India. They need to be considered as they would have an impact on the purchasing power of the cash transfers. We analyzed who would lose and who would benefit from these differences and by how much.
Conceptual framework and methods
We considered a consumer who has a ration card and who can consume wheat and/or rice from two sources -the PDS and the market. The amount consumed from the PDS, q s , at subsidized prices is constrained through the PDS entitlement, q * s , depending on both state and ration card type. As the quantity of the entitlement is usually lower than the total demand for wheat for households, and as prices of PDS grains are lower than market grains, households should take advantage of the full entitlement. In fact, the household data reveals that for many households q s = 0 or q s < q * s . We can determine two types of reasons for this under-purchase: demand and supply. Demand driven under-purchase suggests that PDS grains are imperfect substitutes for market grains. This, in turn, means that consumption from the PDS is not inframarginal, as market and PDS grains are perceived as different products. This view has been supported by Suryanarayana (1995) , who showed that the level of the subsidy was significantly and positively correlated with the PDS consumption.
The demand driven, voluntary, under-purchase might be due to several reasons, such as high transaction costs for obtaining subsidized grains, inferior quality of PDS grains and liquidity constraints of households. The last might prevent households from purchasing the full ration, as PDS beneficiaries are often not allowed to purchase their ration in instalments. All of these reasons for under-purchase are consistent with a positive correlation between the subsidy level and the quantity consumed from the PDS. Another reason for underconsumption of PDS grains, however, could be related to household preferences; household characteristics rather than subsidy levels could be a key explanatory factor for underpurchase.
If under-purchase is due to the supply causes, such as diversion of grains from the PDS to the open market, the difference between the market price and the subsidized price will negatively affect the consumption from the PDS. The higher the price difference, the stronger the incentive for the fair price shop 1 operators to cheat and sell the subsidized grains on the black market at the market price. In areas with many poor people, the leakage rates might be lower because the poor have a higher incentive to enforce the delivery.
Finally, an important question is whether there are differences in factors influencing a switch from q s = 0 to q s > 0 as compared to the incremental increase in q s conditional on q s > 0. Most of the above-mentioned reasons for under-purchase can influence both situations -a complete drop-out from the scheme, as well as the scale of under-purchase. High leakage may result in, for example, non-deliveries to the local fair price shop (q s = 0), or it can result in underweighting (issuing a smaller quantity than the official weight) of the subsidized grains (q s < q * s ). Inferior quality and long waiting times may be reasons for better off households to avoid the PDS and purchase solely from the open market. However, if the transaction costs are low, they may still decide to buy some of the subsidized grains.
In order to analyze these different drivers of consumption from the PDS, we used a simple model: We therefore focus on the partial impact of key variables that clearly influence either demand or supply factors and assess their relevance. We controlled for local differences in functioning of the PDS. These mostly stem from differences in governance, but also relate to different cultures, infrastructure and institutions in general, which significantly affect the functioning of the PDS (Drèze and Khera 2015; Gulati and Saini 2015) . The impact of household characteristics on q s indicates how well the TPDS covers poor and vulnerable households. The impact of income captures the effect of self-targeting. We expected households with higher income and the same access to the PDS (ration card) to have a lower consumption of subsidized grains than poorer households. Further, by incorporating a proportion of households living below the poverty line in the first stage unit 2 (FSU) of sampling as an explanatory variable, we verified the hypothesis from the theoretical model in Mehta and Jha (2014) that pilferage of inferior goods is lower in poorer communities. Finally, we controlled for the demand for wheat and rice by including an FSU-average share (in %) of expenditures on wheat and rice in total food expenditures.
This controls for the case where regions with high demand for wheat and rice might cause high market prices, and incur higher demand than explained by our model. We expected significant differences in the functioning of the PDS for wheat and for rice as they are dominant grains in different states; hence, we treat them separately, allowing for different coefficients in the model.
We estimated a Tobit model for wheat and rice separately:
& where q * s is a latent variable denoting the utility or net benefits a household receives from consuming grains from the PDS, q s is an observed quantity of wheat/rice consumed from the PDS by a household, p ratio is a relative subsidy level per kg (FSUmedian market price of wheat/rice divided by their cardspecific PSD FSU-median price), CT is a card type (dummy for different card types), MPCE is a monthly per capita expenditure (we use as an income proxy), S is a state region dummy, ℍ is a vector of household characteristics (hh size, social group, etc.), Poor is a share of the poor in the FSU, 3 and d is an average share of expenditure on wheat and rice in the total food expenditure (in %) within the FSU. We chose a tobit model instead of a linear regression as there is a significant portion of zero consumption of subsidized grains by eligible consumers, as shown in Table 1 . Further, in order to check the robustness of the results, we controlled for the FSU fixed effects (FE) by subtracting FSU-median values from all the variables (FSU-standardized specification), except for the dummies. Consequently, all the FSU-fixed variables were dropped from the set of controls.
Data
Our estimate was based on the 68th round of the Indian National Sample Survey (NSS) on Household Consumer Expenditure, carried out by India's National Sample Survey Office of the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation. The survey is cross-sectional and representative at the national level (basic sample characteristics are reported in the supplementary material, available online).
The survey was based on a multi-stage stratified design with random household selection. Data were collected between July 2011 and June 2012 and covered demographics and household characteristics, as well as consumption quantity and value, total consumption expenditure, and PDS consumption, quantity and expenditure (NSSO 2013).
We used India's official poverty line estimates from the Rangarajan report (Planning Commission 2014), which are equal to 972 rupees (Rs.) for rural areas and Rs. 1407 for urban areas per month. Mean household expenditures were well above these poverty lines (Table 2 ), but it is estimated that almost 32% of the households lived below the poverty line, with proportionally more poor people living in rural areas (35%). Over half of the average expenditure is spent on food with the consumption of an average of 18.2 kg of rice and 15.7 kg of wheat per month (total of market, PDS and own stock).
In 2011-12 there were three categories of beneficiaries under the TPDS, namely AAY (the poorest of the poor), 4 BPL (Below Poverty-Line) and APL (Above Poverty Line). Grains under these schemes were released to beneficiaries at highly subsidized rates, which differed among states. Rations also differed at state level, particularly for the APL group. The APL allocation is usually below the centrally guaranteed ration, while the full AAY quota of 35 kg per household per month has been observed as consumed in all states (Balani 2013) . In addition to the monthly quota, allocations of food-grains for festivals or calamity reliefs were sporadically provided.
Over 80% of households are estimated to possess some sort of ration card (Table 3 ). This includes ration cards provided by the central government and additional cards from the state authorities. The majority of households (56%) have the APL card, whereas only 5.5% have the AAY card. However, the number of households actually consuming any PDS wheat or rice is much lower -only 44% on average across the whole of India, with 51.8% in rural and 27.8% in urban areas. As a result, the mean PDS grain quantity consumed is very low -6.4 kg of rice and 2.9 kg of wheat per household per month. Seventeen % of households below the poverty line do not have any ration card and around 45% do not consume any subsidized (PDS) grains. This number is very high. It does, however, correlate with the leakage estimates for the survey period, which were between 42% and 47% (Drèze and Khera 2015; Gulati and Saini 2015) . Interestingly, the share of households with zero consumption of PDS grains among APL cardholders was similar for above and below poverty line groups.
PDS consumption analysis
In the first step, we generated implicit unit values of the market-consumed goods by calculating the ratio of expenditure and quantity. Even though we only considered staple foods, and their quality is usually quite uniform, there might be significant differences in varieties (especially in the case of rice) affecting the price level. To avoid measurement bias associated with unit values (Deaton 1988) , problems with missing values, and lower quality, we used an average implicit value for the first stage unit (FSU) to approximate market prices. In order to calculate subsidized prices, we used FSU and ration-card-type specific prices. This allowed us to take into consideration eligible households (ration card holders) with zero purchases from the PDS. Table 1 summarizes PDS consumption by different ration card types. There were clear differences between them. First, the vast majority of the AAY and BPL cardholders use their cards, whereas APL cardholders predominantly do not. Interestingly, AAY cardholders usually consumed both types of subsidized grain (wheat and rice), whereas BPL cardholders tended to purchase just one type. Also, over 30% of AAY rice or wheat consumers did not buy these grains on the market, which means they consumed exclusively from the fair price shops. These numbers are much lower for the APL cardholders. This means that the poorest rely much more on the PDS than the non-poor.
Importantly, despite having the same allowance of 35 kg per household, AAY households, who use their ration cards, on average consumed 30.4 kg of wheat and rice, whereas BPL consumers utilized on average only 21.9 kg. Full PDS consumption, of at least 35 kg per household, was observed in 46% of the AAY households and only 13.8% of the BPL households. It is clear that the BPL households are much less successful than the AAY cardholders in obtaining their full ration. The most striking finding about the APL cardholders was the low usage of ration cards and a high level of zero consumption from the PDS (74%). In the light of these results, there is a need to analyze the reasons for under-purchase and low take-up by eligible households.
First, cardholder groups differ with respect to their financial status (Table 1 ). The total household expenditure of BPL cardholders' was 20% higher than that of the AAY, whereas APL cardholders spend on average 60% more than the BPL group. Different take-up rates and consumption quantities may arise when a subsidy is relatively low compared to the total household expenditure. This would support the hypothesis that the under-purchase of a group is a result of self-targeting. Second, the PDS beneficiaries may live in income and card-type clusters (with similar level of income). This might influence pilferage rates (Mehta and Jha 2014) . Indeed, 29% of FSUs have no poor households and over 45% of FSUs have fewer than 14% of poor households (see supplementary material), indicating possible wealthier areas. On the other hand, there are 16% of FSUs where over 60% of households live below the poverty line, which is a very high concentration of the poor.
Marginal effects of the estimation results are reported in Table 4 for rice and in Table 5 for wheat. 5 The first columns show the results for the pooling together of the price ratio for 5 There were no significant differences in the estimated coefficients for rural and urban sector separately, consequently, we present results of the estimation based on the full sample. all card types (specification 1). The second columns contain the results for the FSU-FE (FSU-standardized) specification (specification 2). The third columns show the price ratio interacted with card type dummies (specification 3). Total household expenditure had a significant and negative impact on consumption of both PDS wheat and rice, and the impact is higher in the case of rice. One additional thousand Rs. of total expenditure can cause a decrease in an average household's consumption of rice by 1 kg and 0.4 kg of wheat. This result holds in the FE specification, as we observed a negative and significant impact of the income variable on consumption of PDS grains. The coefficient is larger in this specification (supplementary material), however, among others, due to different means of the covariates, the marginal effect at means is different. As a result, the magnitudes of the effects should not be compared. This result can be interpreted as evidence for voluntary exclusion of richer households. Also, household size has a positive and significant effect on grain (wheat and rice) consumption. This can be due to per capita allocations in some states or just the number of household members available to go to a fair price shop. In the case of rice, the effect of one additional member of a household is up to 1 kg per month and in the case of wheat, around 0.3 kg. This result was confirmed with the FE specification. All the 'backward' classes, particularly scheduled tribes, consume significantly more subsidized grains. Households belonging to scheduled tribes consumed on average up to 1.3 kg of rice or 1.1 kg of wheat from the PDS, as compared to other (nonbackward) social groups. This result changed in the FE specification. This can be due to the tendency of scheduled tribes and castes to live in the same FSUs, and as a result disturb the results in the FSU-standardized specification. Urban households on average consume less PDS rice than rural ones. Interestingly, households with a regular salary earner consumed significantly less rice, but not wheat. This might suggest that lack of stable income is partially compensated for by stable food supplies through the PDS.
The price subsidy had on average a positive and significant impact on both wheat and rice consumption. This means that the PDS under-purchase is mostly demand driven. As a result, because the PDS grain price is below the market price, we can also conclude that on average, it is treated as an imperfect substitute of the market grains. Furthermore, this finding supports our initial expectation and is in line with the finding of Suryanarayana (1995) that PDS grains are not inframarginal. This means that the food subsidy through the PDS cannot be treated as an equivalent of a cash transfer, effectively increasing household's total disposable income. We can rather expect that it increases total wheat and rice consumption above what would have been consumed without the subsidy.
Besides the income effect, there are other differences between rice and wheat consumption. When the price ratio is interacted with the card type (see columns 3 in Tables 4 and 5) , there is a significant difference between its impact on the consumption of the PDS grains. The price subsidy has a positive and significant impact for both AAY and BPL groups but a positive and insignificant impact on the APL group. This can be linked to the already discussed differences in the leakage rates from APL and BPL quotas, and confirms the hypothesis formulated by Drèze and Khera (2015) . The higher price incentive has a stronger impact on the shop owners to leak grains in the case of the APL quota and a stronger impact on the consumers to buy more in the case of the BPL and the AAY cards. When it comes to wheat consumption, the price subsidy had a positive effect in all card groups, although it was significant only in the APL group. Further, there was a significant positive impact of the proportion of the poor in the FSU on rice consumption. For example, predicted rice consumption per household per month at means (specification 1) grew from around 12.6 kg in a non-poor FSU (0% of poor households) to 14.7 kg in a fully poor FSU (100% of poor households). This is again in line with the hypothesis formulated by Mehta and Jha (2014) that poor communities are more successful in reducing leakage from opaque subsidy programs as they have greater incentives. This effect is insignificant for wheat consumption. In general, it is important to note that these results show that the rice price subsidy is a strong incentive for the poor to consume more PDS rice, but that this effect Source: Own calculation based on the National Sample Survey, 68th round is much weaker for the wheat price subsidy. This difference between the grains might be related to state-level differences. In general, southern states, which are predominantly rice consuming, are characterized by better functioning PDS and better quality of governance which can be important factors in access to PDS (Kumar et al. 2017; Mooij 2001; Rahman et al. 2018 ). This was reflected in coefficient estimates for stateregion dummies, which were mostly significant. A similar effect can be seen in the card-type dummy coefficient estimates. The AAY group consumed significantly more PDS grains than the BPL group, and even more than the APL. This effect for consumption of rice was almost double Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
The AAY card is issued to the poorest of the poor, BPL is a below poverty line and APL is an above poverty line card; State region and lightning code dummy estimates were included but not reported; Omitted card type is AAY; Omitted social group is scheduled tribes; In the FSU-standardized specification, all the variables except dummies were demeaned. Member of the household a regular salary earner is coded 1 for yes and 2 for no.
Source: Own calculation based on the National Sample Survey, 68thround
that for wheat. Despite targeting errors, card-types indicate a level of wealth, which is not covered by expenditure level. Consequently, this result confirms the existence of self-targeting. In addition to the FSU-standardized analysis, in specifications 1 and 3 we included the FSU-average share of expenditure on wheat and rice in the total-food-expenditure variable, to control for local dietary preferences of wheat and rice, which could lead to higher grain uptake and market prices. However, contrary to expectations, the coefficient had a significant and negative value. The proportion of wheat and rice expenditure in the total food expenditure is probably negatively correlated with the availability of the subsidized grains; in areas where there is a well-functioning PDS, the average weighted (subsidized and open market) wheat and rice price was significantly lower and as a result, the expenditure on these products was lower. Following the same logic, a high proportion of expenditure on wheat and rice might or might not be positively correlated with the prevalence of poverty. In general, a high proportion of expenditure on staple food characterizes poor households. However, we detected greater consumption of subsidized wheat and rice by poor, rather than rich, households.
Another important result is that the presence of a female household head had a negative and significant effect on both wheat and rice PDS consumption. Female household heads are often divorced or widowed women. When the effect of a female head of a household is combined with the ration card type (Table 6 ), the negative effect is only significant for the AAY and BPL cardholders. This is also true, to a lesser extent, for the wheat PDS consumption. AAY households with a female head consumed on average 2 kg of PDS rice and 1.2 kg of PDS wheat per month less than their male led counterparts. This is an alarming result, as the women-led households are socially more vulnerable and food insecure (ADB and FAO 2013) and often extremely marginalized (Masoodi 2015) . This malfunction of the PDS has not been mentioned in the literature so far and should be further analyzed. Higher under-purchase is probably related to the marginalization of female-led households, and is why the definition adopted by the National Food Security Act, which is the oldest woman, who is not less than eighteen years of age, is a very important legal provision.
Cash transfers -Simulations
In this section, we analyze self-targeting and purchasing power aspects of replacing the current in-kind transfers with a cash-based system. First, based on the insights from the previous regression analyses, we estimate potential cost savings from self-targeting, which would be lost under a cash-based system. Second, using the data from the NSS, we estimate the size of regional differences in nominal rice and wheat prices.
Self-targeting
Self-targeting can save costs for the government. To estimate how much is saved, we used our results from the tobit model estimation (specification 1 from Tables 5 and 6 ). Our procedure calculated predicted values of consumption from the PDS for wheat and rice in two ways: without any restrictions, and assuming the lowest decile of income. Negative values are substituted with zeroes, as they correspond with a negative propensity to consume (predicted latent variable) and would hence result in zero consumption. The difference between these two predictions provides an estimate of the grains saved due to self-targeting. This result is likely to be a lower limit of the savings as other household characteristics (caste, card ownership and PDS vs. market price differential), which we have not considered here, may further reduce demand for PDS grains. We decided not to include these other characteristics as they may also affect the supply of PDS grains, and thus lead to an over-estimation of the self-targeting effect.
The results show an average saving of 0.85 kg of rice and 0.28 kg of wheat per month per household holding a ration card. To calculate the total savings resulting from the selftargeting by income, we aggregated the savings over the eligible households. The details are presented in Table 7 . The total annual saving is 3.3 million t, which is close to 6.5% of the total TPDS offtake (year 2011/12). Due to broader coverage, this number would be probably even higher under the NFSA.
Regional price differences
Nominal market prices vary substantially across regions (figures in the supplementary material) . Most of the prices range between Rs./kg 10 and Rs./kg 40. As cash transfers should enable households to purchase a specific amount of food, the level of transfers should also reflect differences in nominal prices.
For our analysis, we focused only on current regional price differences. We did not consider any changes in market prices on the all-India level, which would be caused by moving to cash-transfers as this would require a much more complex modeling approach. The PDS is linked to government procurement, storage and trade regulations, which is a part of producer subsidy and market price stabilization policy (Saini and Kozicka 2014) . As a result, any changes in the PDS will probably involve changes in procurement, storage and trade leading to increasing or declining grain prices (Kozicka et al. 2017) . For example, as simulated by Kozicka et al. (2017) with a partial (wheat and rice market) equilibrium model, the average market price is higher by 5.6% for wheat and by 7.7% for rice under cash transfers (equivalent to the NFSA) in the medium term, as compared to the NFSA in-kind subsidy system. On the other hand, moving to cash transfers lowers the local supply of grain, particularly in remote areas, due to the withdrawal of the fair price shops, giving rise to higher prices. For example, as shown by Cunha et al. (2011) , in Mexico, prices in the villages receiving payment-in-kind transfers on average decreased by 4%, whereas prices did not change in the villages receiving cash. This further emphasizes the need to closely monitor market prices and to adjust cash transfers on a timely basis.
To estimate real income effects for different consumer groups due to regional price differences, we calculated the cash transfer required for the state S specific median price p S,c , where c is a commodity subscript (wheat and rice). The Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
The AAY card is issued to the poorest of the poor, BPL is a below poverty line and APL is an above poverty line card; State region and lightning code dummy estimates were included but not reported; Omitted card type is AAY;
Omitted social group is scheduled tribes; In the FSU-standardized specification, all the variables except dummies were demeaned; Member of the household a regular salary earner is coded 1 for yes and 2 for no.
Source: Own calculation based on the National Sample Survey, 68th h round price is calculated as a median of implicit unit values (a ratio of expenditure and quantity consumed) on a household level of the market-consumed wheat and rice over the entire state. In contrast, the price a consumer would face is approximated by p
, where FSU is an FSU subscript, as the median of implicit unit values at the FSU level. The difference between the expenditure on wheat and rice consumption in state-level prices (cash transfer) and in FSU-level prices (actual expenditure) denotes the gap between cash received and spent on wheat and rice under the subsidy scheme.
We compared two designs -one is equivalent to the actual PDS consumption (old PDS), based on the NSS 68th round, and the other one is equivalent to the coverage and quantities prescribed by the NFSA. For the old PDS equivalent, we use the actual PDS consumption quantities of wheat and rice of a household h, PDS c S;FSU;h ; to calculate the benefit, B S,FSU,h , under a cash transfer scheme with an equivalent grain entitlement that is the difference between the received transfer and the actual expenditure:
To evaluate a cash transfer equivalent to the NFSA obligations, we first assigned to each household a subsidized wheat and rice allocation according to the NFSA. Seventy-five % of the rural and 50% of the urban poorest households (based on expenditure) received 5 kg of food-grains per capita per month, except for the existing AAY cardholders who received 35 kg per household per month. This quantity was distributed between wheat and rice in the same proportion as the state median PDS consumption. Furthermore, the cash benefit was calculated in a similar way as under the old PDS system equivalent, where the PDS consumption was substituted with the NFSA allocation. Table 8 presents the mean of rural, urban, poor, 6 and nonpoor households' income losses (negative values) or gains (positive values) per month in rupees and as a share of total cash transfer, resulting from the implementation of cash transfers.
Under both the old PDS system and the NFSA equivalents, rural families benefit from the cash transfers more than urban ones. However, the difference was not large. For example, under the equivalent of the old PDS system it is close to Rs. 24 per household, which is on average equal to 1.9 kg of rice or 2.2 kg of wheat 7 and constitutes less than 5% of the total transfer. However, this can vary significantly -the 90th percentile in this group is equal to 20% of the total transfer. Importantly, urban beneficiaries can buy fewer grains than under in-kind distribution. This is because the relatively higher grain prices in urban areas, generate a lower purchasing power than would exist with the state median price. In the NFSA equivalent system, the mean benefit constitutes almost 6 Expenditure below the Rangarajan poverty line (Planning Commission 2014) 7 This means that on average a rural household can afford 1.9 kg of rice or 2.2 kg of wheat if they receive cash as compared to the in-kind food distribution. Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Exogenous variable set the same as in regressions in Tables 6 and 7, column 3 AAY card is issued to the poorest of the poor, BPL is a below poverty line and APL is an above poverty line card;
Source: Own calculation based on the NSS, 68th round Total annual saving (tonnes) 3,336,005 Total saving (% of total PDS off-takes) 6.5%
Source: Own calculation based on the National Sample Survey, 68th round 10% of the total transfer and goes up to over 30% in the 10th percentile of the distribution. Also, on average, the poor benefit more from the cash system than non-poor. The mean of the benefit for these groups is not large -4.5% of the total transfer in the old PDS equivalent. However, the benefit reaches almost 20% in the 90th percentile, which can be a significant gain for the poor. This is because of the income stratification of the society, as discussed above, where the poor tend to live separately from the non-poor. This is correlated with lower FSU-average prices in the 'poor' FSUs as compared to the 'non-poor' FSUs. This has several policy implications. First, prices should be carefully monitored and cash transfers should be indexed to nominal market prices. Second, to protect the urban poor, there should be an adjustment in the cash transfer amount to compensate for higher prices in urban areas. Third, better access to credit and insurance are even more important for the smoothing of consumption in the light of higher staple food price volatility under cash transfers.
Summary and conclusions
We found strong evidence that PDS consumption differs across ration card types (AAY, BPL and APL) and grain types (wheat and rice), which can be explained by both demand-side and supply-side drivers. A high price differential between subsidized prices and market prices for rice induces shop owners to leak grains in the case of the APL quota. In the case of the BPL and AAY ration cards, however, this differential increases purchases by consumers. This means that the APL cardholders who turn to the PDS scheme, are income driven and are prevented from consuming more subsidized grains by leakage and diversion. These results confirm the hypothesis made by Drèze and Khera (2015) that under-purchase is also a consequence of misinformation about the ration entitlement among the APL cardholders. Furthermore, PDS recipients in poor areas consume slightly more PDS grains which might be attributed to better monitoring of fair price shops and, consequently, lower leakage. Again, these results are significant only for rice, which might be related to the state-level differences, with southern states, which are predominantly rice consuming, having a better functioning PDS and better quality of governance. Rice also seems to be a more basic staple food, with higher demand among the poorest consumers.
Our results further identify severe targeting errors for female-led households, especially in AAY and BPL groups, who are not well covered by the TPDS. Moreover, despite having a card, female-led households tend to under-purchase from the PDS.
Richer households tend to consume less of the subsidized grains. This result is robust to the fixed-effect like specification, where we control for regional differences, and the use of card types as indicator of wealth. Our results imply that there is self-targeting in the PDS -poor and vulnerable households, except for female-led households, which tend to consume more from the PDS. Poor households (with AAY and BPL card) respond positively to higher price subsidies while richer households tend to voluntarily consume less.
Our findings on self-targeting are highly relevant for reforming the current payment-in-kind subsidy and replacing it with a cash-transfer scheme. We estimate that a minimum of 6.5% of grains were 'saved' due to self-exclusion by affluent households under the old PDS system. With the increased coverage under the NFSA, which would be even higher in a scenario of universal coverage, this number would further increase. Furthermore, the increase in PDS consumption (and thus, costs of the subsidy) of moving to a universal public distribution system would be less than previously thought. Further, exclusion errors would be eliminated, and administrative costs and corruption practices reduced (Himanshu and Sen 2011) . The benefits of cash transfers, on the other hand, can be substantial due to lower operational costs, better control over leakage and lower dead-weight loss (a cost generated by an economically inefficient allocation of resources within the market) due to distorted prices (Kozicka et al. 2017) . Growing evidence shows that child nutrition and a household's food security status can be improved by cash transfers (Agüero et al. 2007; Behrman and Hoddinott 2005; Haushofer and Shapiro 2013) . However, average food prices would probably increase under a cash-based system, worsening the effect of exclusion targeting errors. Furthermore, under a cashtransfer scheme, regional price differences would need to be addressed. Even though the poor seem to be better off when receiving a cash subsidy, the urban population could be significantly worse-off because of higher market prices in cities. These considerations show that there are several advantages and disadvantages associated with cash-based systems compared to the existing in-kind transfer system. It is crucial to consider these arguments and effects, when reforming food security policies in India.
